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Abstract
In knowledge economies, patent agencies are often viewed as a relevant instrument of an eﬃcient
innovation policy. This paper brings a new support to that idea. We claim that these agencies
should play an increasing role in the regulation of the relation between heterogeneous private
R&D labs and public fundamental research units, especially concerning the question of the
appropriation of free basic research results. Since these two institutions work with opposite
institutional arrangements (see Dasgupta and David [9]), we essentially argue that there is, on
the one hand, an over-appropriation of these results while, on the other hand, there is also an
under-provision of free usable results issued from more fundamental research. We show how a
public patent oﬃce can restore eﬃciency.
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1 Introduction
Should the patents fees only cover the patents oﬃces examination costs or should these fees be
a major lever of an innovation policy in a Knowledge based economy? In order to answer this
question, several economists suggest, in the line of Scotchmer [23], that these fees, especially their
modulation, render the innovation process more eﬃcient1. However most of these arguments are
worked out in a technological world where Knowledge satisfies the patentability criteria of utility,
novelty and non-obviousness. In this paper, we suggest a new argument in favor of the use of
patents fees as a policy instrument by looking upstream, at the interaction between Science and
Technology.
In fact, Dasgupta and David [9] proposed to define Science and Technology neither according
to the types of Knowledge (general principles versus applied Knowledge) they produce nor on the
methods of inquiry (focus versus broader perspective) they adopt but as distinct institutional
arrangements, broadly corresponding to non-market and market allocation mechanisms2. But
concerning these institution, it is also largely recognized, especially by several empirical studies,
that there are real eﬀects of academic research on corporate patents. According to Jaﬀe’s [15]
seminal contribution, the elasticity of economically useful Knowledge - measured by the amount
of induced corporate patents - with respect to academic research is quite important3, even if
this contribution is relatively scattered. For instance, Klevorick and al. [17] observed that the
direct impact of recent University research in most industries is small when assessed relatively
to other sources of scientific Knowledge, while Cohen and al. [7] argue, by making use of the
Carnegie Mellon database, that the basic research strongly aﬀects industrials R&D but that the
channels are not those who are expected in the sense that there is not a direct causal link from
fundamental research to new applied projects and patents. Their survey however indicates (see
table 5 in Cohen and al. [7]) that the key channels of the impact of the university research
essentially goes through published papers, reports, public conferences and informal exchanges,
that is to say through totally free and open scientific results.
So, even if there is a debate that tries to identify which of these indirect channels is the
more eﬃcient4 or to which firm it is mostly helpful5, we must recognized that (i) the production
1 In the line of this paper which emphasizes the impact of the renewal fees, the reader is also referred to Cornelli
and Schankerman [8]. For more general recommendations concerning the innovation policy, see Encaoua, Guellec
and Martinez [10].
2See also Barba Naveretti and al. [5] or Carraro and Siniscalco [6].
3For other empirical studies going in the same direction, see also Adams [2] or Narin and al. [21].
4One often opposes informal local exchange to worldwide published results, see for instance, respectively,
Audretsch and al. [4] who argue that geographic considerations matter, while Cohen and al. [7] put forward open
science channels such as publications.
5See for instance, respectively, Acs and al. [1] who emphasize comparative advantages of small startups, versus
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of Knowledge which encompasses both Science and Technology involves various actors with
diﬀerent motivations and (ii) the transformation of basic Knowledge into product or process
innovations is not as mechanical as predicted in the said linear model of innovation. All the
basic ingredients inducing ineﬃciency are therefore present. Our claim is that:
• patents fees can be viewed as tools which helps to restore eﬃciency in the process of
privatization of free scientific Knowledge,
• and that this fees can be reallocated to the Universities in the form of an incentive scheme
which increases the set of useful, patentable, Knowledge.
To be more precise, we consider, in the sense of Dasgupta and David [9], two basic institu-
tional arrangements. One the one hand, we look at the University (in, perhaps, some narrow
sense) which produces generic basic Knowledge with its own system of incentives and we assume
that this Knowledge is freely available and only more or less useful, i.e. it does not meet the
criteria of a patents agency. On the other hand, we introduce what we call Private Labs, i.e.
institutions which have the ability to access to this Knowledge (or to a part of it), to use it
in order to solve market based R&D puzzles and, by the way, to partially privatize this free
Knowledge6. In other words, the first institution produced only indirectly - because it is less
valuated by its own system of incentives - potential R&D solutions, while the heterogeneous
Private Labs take advantage of this free Knowledge in order to solve market driven technical
problems and compete for its acquisition.
But these freely available embryonic inventions often require further developments for com-
mercial success7: they must be accommodated at some costs. We can even expect that this
transformation activity exhibits decreasing returns to scale. The easiest potential R&D so-
lutions will be treated first, while the others will be postponed until later due to increasing
accommodation costs. In other words, one can expect that the profitability of these Private
Labs is not only decreasing with the amount of free Knowledge they accommodate but also with
the stock of free ideas which is appropriated by all these units. In other words, the appropriation
of this common induces negative external costs which lead to an excessive patenting behavior.
Link and Rees [19] who put forward the existence of R&D departments in large firms.
6By doing so, we implicitely assume that a part of the Academic Knowledge is immediately valuable. We
therefore neglect the question of the progressive maturation of an idea and the debate around the relative contri-
bution of the public and the private research sectors (see for instance Aghion-Dewatripont and Stein [3]). This is
leaved for a later work.
7Even if, in general, patents can be based on either basic or applied research, recent survey evidence suggests
that potential R&D solutions must often be adjusted, or even totally rethought, in order to meet the taste of the
consummers (Thursby and al. [25]).
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This is why we suggest that a cautious choice of the patents fees contributes to an adjustment
of the private appropriation costs to the social one8.
If we go a step further, we even observe that this common which is appropriated by the
Private Labs is not as limited as expected: it can be increased by targeted research programs.
In fact, if these programs are not too circumscribed to operational Knowledge, we can expect that
these results meet, at least partially, the incentives schemes of academic research and therefore
increase the set of freely useful Knowledge. But, we must also accept the idea that researchers
who contribute to these programs are nevertheless forced to deviate from the optimal strategy
dictated by pure research criteria and therefore support a cost which must, at least, be covered
by a financial transfer. This therefore suggests that the patents fees, which are levied in order to
reduce the appropriation costs, must be allocated to these programs: it does not only increases
the positive externality of academic research on technological innovation but it also reduces the
social appropriation costs of scientific Knowledge, by extending the common.
Our paper mainly illustrates this prospect. We first introduce, in section 2, our basic as-
sumptions on the behavior of the University and of the Private Labs in order to emphasize, on
the one hand, the possibility for the University to deviate from her optimal strategy and, on the
other one, the external appropriation costs which are at hand in the private sector. By keep-
ing the stock of freely available Knowledge as given, we characterize in section 3 the strategic
Knowledge appropriation behaviors which lead to a Tragedy of the Commons. We then propose
in section 4 a patents fiscal scheme which has the property to implement an optimal allocation
and to be accepted by all Private Labs. In section 5, we then show that a patents agency has
even the ability to couple this fiscal scheme with the sponsorship of targeted research program,
in order to implement an optimal provision and allocation of the more or less applied and freely
available ideas induced by academic research. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper and an
appendix is dedicated the proofs of the diﬀerent propositions.
2 The model
In order to illustrate this feature, we need two kinds of actors: the University and the Private
R&D Labs. We mainly look at their strategic interactions. This is why we do not directly address
the question of the production of basic and applied Knowledge, which tackles the question of the
8This is not in contradiction with the Anticommons problem suggested by Heller and Eisenberg [14]. We
simply suggest that an excessive patenting behavior which induces in a second step an Anticommons Tragedy can
be initiated by a Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin [13]).
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scientists’ decision9 in both the University and the Private R&D Laboratories. We rather take
some macroscopic view which takes these decisions as granted and which gives us the opportunity
to focus on the problems induced by their interactions. So let us now present the assumptions
we made on the University and the Private R&D Labs.
2.1 The University
We assume that there is a public institution - a University, for instance - which conducts funda-
mental research on the basis of public funds. This institution operates by its own rules, typically
a peer validation one, which provide incentives to produce basic research, and, by the way, to
produce a set of free useful ideas for the industry. Since we concentrate our attention on the
interactions between the University and the Private Labs, we however do not explicitly model
the behavior of the researchers within the University. We simply assume that a given stock of
public funds generates both fundamental Knowledge and a stock y of applicable ideas and that
the allocation of the research activity between both fields corresponds to an optimal running of
the institution in the sense that each researcher has chosen her optimal strategy given the said
peer validation rule.
This also implies that these optimal behaviors can only be changed at some costs. This
may happen, for instance, if the University wants to increase of ∆ the stock of applicable ideas
relatively to its optimal level y. This is why we introduce a function C(∆) which measures the
cost supported by the University if she decides to encourage her members to increase the set
of applicable ideas of an amount of ∆. This last function captures, in other words, the cost
induced by the deviation from a standard research activity, based on pure academic research, to
a more applied one. But this does not necessarily imply that these activities act as substitutes.
If they are, for instance, complementary10, and if an optimal mixture is chosen under a specific
institutional arrangement, we simply claim that any change in this mixture leads to a worse
solution and hence induces a cost of change.
Moreover if this cost comes from a deviation from an optimal solution of a concave program,
it is immediate that C(∆) is increasing and convex, i.e. dCd∆ > 0,
d2C
d∆2 > 0 and that C(0) = 0.
We also assume, in the same vein, that very small deviations are not too costly while very large
ones are prohibitive, i.e. lim∆→0 dCd∆ = 0 and lim∆→+∞
dC
d∆ = +∞.
9The reader is refered, for instance, to Levin and Stephan’s [18] early theoretical contribution or, more recently,
to Jensen and al. [16] or Thursby and al. [26].
10See for instance Zucker and al. [27], Murray [20] or Stephan and al. [24] who recently claimed that basic and
applied researches are complementary.
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2.2 The Private R&D Labs
Let us now move to the behavior of the j = 1, ...,m Private R&D Labs. Each Lab transforms a
certain amount xj of freely available Knowledge y into private patented Knowledge. Since this
Knowledge becomes by this transformation mutually exclusive, we denote by X :=
Pm
j=1 xj the
total amount of patented ideas.
This patenting activity, even if it is done at some R&D costs (in order to adapt the free
ideas), is assumed to increase the profitability of firm j. Several standard Industrial Organization
arguments can be recalled in order to justify such an assumption, going from the construction
of a dominant position on existing market to the development of new profit opportunities by
creating new products. We take all these arguments for granted and simply assume that the
profit πj is increasing in the number of patented ideas xj .
But, one of the assumption of the paper is that the set y of free ideas is heterogeneous
in the sense that some ideas are less costly to accommodate than some others. The diﬀerent
Labs will of course compete for the ideas which are easier to accommodate, but are, ex ante,
uncertain on the result of this competition. Since the accommodation cost increases with the
total number of adopted ideas, we argue that the expected individual accommodation costs must
be at least related to the number of unused free ideas. This is why we decided to use the amount
of remaining free ideas S := y −X as an indicator of the level of these accommodation costs.
We, of course, expect that these costs are decreasing with S, seeing that a lower residual stock
of free ideas indicates a greater adoption of less productive ideas. In order to spare notations,
we nevertheless do not explicitly introduce this cost function, we simply say that the profit
πj (xj , S) of each private Lab is a function of both the quantity of free Knowledge she patents
and the remaining stock S of free ideas. We also try to keep this function as general as possible.
However, due to this negative externality, it is a matter of fact to observe that these m
Labs play a game in which they simultaneously decide on the amount xj of public Knowledge
they transform into a private one by having in mind that they receive a payoﬀ of πj (xj , S) .
So, in order to make sure that the competition between firms is not too severe, we introduce
some strategic substitutability by controlling the eﬀect of the residual stock of Knowledge on
the marginal productivity of the patents xj . Moreover, we also need more technical assumptions
which guarantee the interiority of our solutions. We first say that a firm who patents some
free Knowledge as the remaining stock becomes null has always an incentive to decrease her
patenting activity xj in order to benefit from the induced increase with the residual stock of
free Knowledge. Secondly, we assume that every firm is active, even from the point of view of
the social planner: if the patenting level of one firm j is low, the marginal gain of an increase of
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patents xj covers the aggregate costs due to the negative externality.
To summarize, we assume that each Private R&D Lab j is characterized by a profit function
πj (xj , S) satisfying the following restrictions:
1. This function is increasing, i.e. ∂xjπj > 0 and ∂Sπj > 0, globally strictly concave (which
implies that ∂2S,Sπj and ∂
2
xj ,xjπj < 0) and satisfies ∂
2
xj ,Sπj ≥ 0 (i.e. the best responses are
strategic substitutes11).
2. Inactivity is allowed, i.e. ∀S, πj (0, S) = 0.
3. The following boundary conditions12 are met: (i) ∀xj > 0, lim
S→0
∂xjπj/∂Sπj < 1 (ii) ∀S > 0,
lim
xj→0
∂xjπj/
mP
k=1
∂Sπk > 1 and (iii) ∀S > 0, lim
xj→∞
∂xjπj/∂Sπj < 1.
3 The ineﬃcient patents allocation
The existence of external costs between the diﬀerent users of this stock y of free Knowledge
leads immediately to the following definition of a patents allocation.
Definition 1 Given any stock y of free Knowledge produced by the University, a Nash equilib-
rium allocation of patents, also called a decentralized or an ineﬃcient one, is a vector (xdj (y))
m
j=1 ∈
Rm+ given by:
∀j = 1, . . . ,m xdj (y) ∈ argmax
xj∈R+
πj
⎛
⎜⎜⎝xj , y − xj −
mX
k=1
k 6=j
xdk
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ s.t y − xj −
mX
k=1
k 6=j
xdk ≥ 0
And in order to check consistency, we can prove, under our assumptions, that:
Proposition 1 For any strictly positive free Knowledge stock y, this game admits a unique
interior Nash equilibrium which has the property that the marginal private benefit of patent-
ing, ∂xjπj, is equal to the marginal private costs of patenting, ∂Sπj, which is captured by the
11Note also that we implicitly assume that ∂2S,Sπj∂
2
xj ,xjπj−
³
∂2xj ,Sπj
´2
> 0, otherwise the Hessian of πj(xj , S)
is not negative definite.
12The reader can be surprised by this asymmetrical treatment, but it is a matter of fact to observe that
the first boundary assumption implies that ∀xj > 0, lim
S→0
∂xjπj/
µ
mP
k=1
∂Sπj
¶
< 1 while the second induces that
∀S > 0, lim
xj→0
∂xjπj/∂Sπk > 1. Interiority is therefore guaranteed in both the centralized and the decentralized
problems.
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decrease of the remaining stock of free idea. More formally we verify that:
∀j = 1, . . . ,m ∂xjπj
⎛
⎜⎜⎝x
d
j , y − xdj −
mX
k=1
k 6=j
xdk
⎞
⎟⎟⎠− ∂Sπj
⎛
⎜⎜⎝x
d
j , y − xdj −
mX
k=1
k 6=j
xdk
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ = 0 (1)
It now remains to understand how the stock y of free Knowledge impacts the patenting strate-
gies
³
xdj (y)
´m
j=1
and the equilibrium payoﬀs
³
πdj (y)
´m
j=1
:=
³
πj(xdj (y), y −
Pm
j=1 x
d
j (y))
´m
j=1
.
Since the University exerts a positive externality on the Private Labs, we expect that both func-
tion are increasing. This is immediate when all Labs are symmetric. In this case, condition (1)
can be reduced to a single equation given by:
∂xπ
³
xd, y −mxd
´
− ∂Sπ
³
xd, y −mxd
´
= 0 (2)
and a standard computation leads to:
dxd
dy
=
∂2x,Sπ − ∂2S,Sπ³
∂2S,xπ − ∂2x,xπ
´
+m
³
∂2x,Sπ − ∂2S,Sπ
´ ≤ ∂2x,Sπ − ∂2S,Sπ
m
³
∂2x,Sπ − ∂2S,Sπ
´
which implies that dx
d
dy ∈
£
0, 1m
¤
. It follows that the equilibrium profits πdj (y) accruing to each
firm are increasing with the stock y of useful ideas:
dπd
dy
= (∂xπ −m∂Sπ)
dxd
dy
+ ∂Sπ
=
∙
1− (m− 1) dx
d
dy
¸
∂Sπ (by the first order equilibrium conditions)
≥ 0 (since dx
d
dy
<
1
m
)
Using again symmetry, we also obtain that the aggregate equilibrium profits accruing to the
private sector,
Πd(y) :=
mX
j=1
πdj (y) = mπ
d(y)
and the total patents allocation,
Xd(y) =
mX
j=1
xdj (y) = mx
d(y)
are also increasing with y.
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By making use of a more elaborated argument presented in the appendix and based on the
proof of proposition 1, we can even extend these results to the non-symmetric case and state
that:
Proposition 2 For any strictly positive free Knowledge stock y, the individual allocation of
patents xdj (y) and the profits accruing to each firm π
d
j (y) are increasing with the stock y of useful
ideas. And so are the aggregate allocation Xd(y) and profits Πd(y).
4 Overuse of free Knowledge and optimal patents taxation
It is first a matter of fact to observe that the Private Labs, at a Nash equilibrium, does not care
about the external accommodation costs. In fact, when a Lab increases her patents, she knows
that she modifies her own costs of exploiting an additional free idea, but she does not realize
that she also increases the adoption costs for all the other Labs. This Tragedy of the Commons
usually leads to an ineﬃcient patents allocation characterized by a global over-investment in the
patenting activity.
In order to present this problem, let us, as in the previous section, take as given the stock y of
free Knowledge and let us look at a central planer allocation of the patents. Such an allocation
is characterized in definition 2.
Definition 2 Given any stock y of free Knowledge produced by the University, a centralized,
also said decentralized, patents allocation is a vector
³
xcj(y)
´m
j=1
∈ Rm+ with the property that:
¡
xcj(y)
¢m
j=1
∈ argmax
(xj)
m
j=1∈Rm+
mX
j=1
πj (xj , y −X) s.t. y −X ≥ 0
The reader immediately observes what is stated in the following remark.
Remark 1 This problem admits a unique solution since:
(i) the objective function is strictly concave because ∀j, πj (xj , S) has this property,
(ii) as y is given, the domain of the problem is compact and convex.
Moreover, our restrictions on the marginal rates of substitution between xj and S on the
boundaries ensure that this solution is an interior one. The following first order conditions are
therefore necessary and suﬃcient:
∀j = 1, ...,m ∂xjπj
¡
xcj , y −Xc
¢
−
mX
k=1
∂Sπk
¡
xcj , y −Xc
¢
= 0 with Xc :=
mX
j=1
xcj (3)
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By comparing equations (1) and (3), we observe that, in the centralized case, the congestion
eﬀects induced by the patenting activity is internalized by the central planner, i.e. the negative
eﬀect of a new patent on the stock of free Knowledge and so on the profits is considered in
aggregate. In other words, it is the social accommodation costs of an idea which matter here,
instead of the private costs like in a decentralized allocation. This suggests, if we have in mind
the symmetric case, that each Lab should optimally invest less in patents. But this intuition
does not extend to the asymmetrical case since one Lab should perhaps increase her activity
while another should be refrained. We nevertheless prove that there is, at the aggregate level,
an overuse of the free resource y. In fact we say that:
Proposition 3 For a given stock of useful Knowledge y, the centralized allocation problem in-
duces a lower aggregate level of patents than the decentralized one, i.e.
Xc(y) :=
mX
j=1
xcj(y) < X
d(y) :=
mX
j=1
xdj (y)
while the aggregate profit is higher in the centralized case than in the decentralized one, i.e.
Πc(y) :=
mX
j=1
πj
¡
xcj(y), y −Xc(y)
¢
≥ Πd(y) :=
mX
j=1
πj
³
xdj (y), y −Xd(y)
´
This last proposition also suggests that there is some room for a public policy since there is a
gain in aggregate from the implementation of the centralized solution and it is immediate that
this policy must be implemented by a patents public agency which has the ability to modulate
the patents fees.
Let us first illustrate this argument in the symmetric case before moving to the more general
case. In this simplified set-up, equation (3) becomes:
∂xπ (x
c, y −mxc)−m∂Sπ (xc, y −mxc) = 0 (4)
By comparing equation (4) to (2), we observe that a patents agency which introduce a pigovian
tax on each patent given by t = (m− 1) ∂Sπ
¡
xc, yd −mxc
¢
, hence slows down the patents race
by implementing an optimal allocation. But this also increases the gross profits (before taxation)
accruing to each Lab. The patents agency has therefore even the opportunity to associate a
lump-sum transfer, which leaves each firm at the same profit level as in the decentralized case
and which is given by:
F = π
³
xd, y −mxd
´
− π (xc, y −mxc) + Ix>0txc
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where Ix>0 = 1 if x > 0 and 0 otherwise. Moreover, by acting in this way, the patents agency
will be sure that (i) the unique outcome of the decentralized patents allocation coincides to the
eﬃcient solution, (ii) the firms are willing to participate since they maintain their profits at their
initial level, and (iii) all additional profits are collected for, as we will see later, further use.
This intuition straightforwardly extends to the asymmetrical case. We simply need to check
that the set of Nash Equilibria (NE) of the game modified by the fiscal scheme coincides with
the set of optimal allocations. Since we also know from the remark 1 that every centralized
solution is unique, we can therefore conclude that the decentralized equilibrium of the modified
game exists and is unique.
Proposition 4 Let the stock of useful Knowledge y produced by the University be taken as given,
if we introduce, in a decentralized patents allocation mechanism (see definition 1), a distortionary
tax system on patents and a lump-sum transfer scheme, given respectively by:
tj(y) =
mX
k=1
k 6=j
∂Sπk (x
c
k(y), y −Xc(y))
and:
Fj(y) =
h
πj
³
xdj , y −Xd
´
− πj
¡
xcj , y −Xc
¢i
+ Ixj>0tjx
c
j
where Ixj>0 = 0 if xj = 0 and 1 if xj > 0, we can assert that the unique decentralized patents
allocation of the modified game corresponds to the eﬃcient allocation introduced in definition 2.
Let us, finally, spell out some properties of the centralized solution. These results will help
to conduct the discussion in our next section.
Proposition 5 We observe that:
(i) The implementation of this fiscal scheme leaves to the patents agency an amount of money
Πc(y) − Πd(y) ≥ 0, this inequality holding strictly when the decentralized allocation introduced
in definition 1 is ineﬃcient.
(ii) The aggregate profit Πc(y) at a centralized solution is increasing and strictly concave with
respect to the amount y of freely available Knowledge.
(iii) At an eﬃcient solution, the total amount Xc(y) of free Knowledge which is applied in
order to solve market puzzles as well as the residual stock Sc(y) of unused free Knowledge are
increasing with the stock y of freely available Knowledge.
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5 Toward a reallocation of the patents fees to the University
The preceding section tells us, loosely speaking, that independently of the stock of free available
Knowledge, the patents agency has always an incentive to collect fees in order to limit the over-
appropriation of the free and potentially applicable Knowledge produced by the University. By
doing so, this public agency implements an optimal allocation which leaves her some money
back since she collects all the additional gains of the Private Labs with respect to a situation
without regulation.
Now let us bring to mind that:
• the total amount Xc(y) of innovations increases with the amount of freely available Knowl-
edge (see (iii) of proposition 5). We can therefore expect, even if this is not a part of our
model, that the welfare also increases with y since a larger amount Xc(y) of scientific
Knowledge can then be transformed into new demand driven technical solutions.
• The residual stock Sc(y) of unused free Knowledge is also increasing with y (see again (iii)
of proposition 5). This suggests, when the optimal patents allocation is implemented, that
the social accommodation costs of new ideas decrease as y growths. This will again be
welfare improving.
• The profits left to the Private Labs after taxation, and which correspond to the one they
obtain at a Nash equilibrium, are increasing with the stock of free available Knowledge
(see proposition 2). Private Labs are also better oﬀ when y increases.
These three observations therefore suggest that a patents public agency must not only collect
fees in order to limit the over-appropriation of free Knowledge. She also ought to support more
or less focused research programs whose results meet, at least partially, the peer validation
criterion, so that these results stay in the public domain and increase the set y of potentially
applicable Knowledge.
We know that the realization of such programs requires a deviation from the optimal research
strategy dictated by the institutional arrangement being at work in the academic sector: the
University supports a cost C(∆) when an increase ∆ of the amount y of free useful ideas is
requested. So, by taking the position of a central planner or, here, of our patents public agency,
the question becomes the following one: what is the optimal increase ∆ that can be implemented
by targeted research programs knowing that the patents allocation is an eﬃcient one?
A natural way to answer this question consists in comparing the marginal cost supported by
the University to the marginal gains of an increase of y when an optimal patents allocation is
11
implemented. In other words, we should set ∆ to ∆∗ given by:
∆∗ ∈ argmax
∆≥0
Πc(y +∆)− C(∆)
And it is a matter of fact to observe what is explained in the next remark.
Remark 2 There always exists a unique strictly positive solution to the previous program be-
cause (i) we know by proposition 5 that Πc is increasing and strictly concave and (ii) we have
assumed that C(∆) is concave and verifies lim∆→0 dCd∆ = 0 and lim∆→+∞
dC
d∆ = +∞.
But this answer gives us no indication on the implementation of this optimal solution in a
way that meets the agreement of the University and the Private Labs. To be more precise, up to
now, we know that a patents public agency has the ability, whatever the stock of free Knowledge
is, to implement an eﬃcient allocation which leaves each private Lab at least at the same level
of profit as initially. But nothing insures that the maximum amount of money that can be
collected when the stock of free available Knowledge is (y +∆∗) covers the cost supported by
the University in order to attain this level.
In order to check this, it becomes important to identify the outside options of the Private
Labs and the University. So let us assume that the patents agency makes a take or leave oﬀer
including simultaneously a fiscal scheme for the first and a bundle of research contracts for the
second. In this case, each private Lab compare her new profit level to the one she obtains
in a decentralized patents allocation when no additional free Knowledge is produced while the
University strikes a balance between a pure research strategy inducing no cost of change and
returns induced by research contracts.
This suggests that the optimal increase ∆∗ is implementable only if the sum of the deviation
cost C(∆∗) supported by the University and the aggregate profits of the Labs when no policy
is implemented is smaller than the aggregate profit level obtained at the centralized solution.
In order to check that point, let us first consider the symmetric case. Under this configu-
ration, let us denote by xc∗ the symmetric centralized patents allocation for a free Knowledge
stock being equal to (y +∆∗), i.e. the quantity which solves13:
∂xπ (xc∗, y +∆∗ −mxc∗)−m∂Sπ (xc∗, y +∆∗ −mxc∗) = 0
13This quantity, of course, exists and is unique because we have, in the last section, worked out our argument
whatever y is. So it is especially true for y = y0 +∆∗.
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Let us bring to mind that xd is the symmetric Nash patents allocation when no additional eﬀort
is asked to the University, i.e. the quantity which solves:
∂xπ
³
xd, y −mxd
´
− ∂Sπ
³
xd, y −mxd
´
= 0
Since the public patents agency is willing to implement xc∗, she must set her pigovian tax rate
at:
t = (m− 1) ∂Sπ (xc∗, y +∆∗ −mxc∗)
But she knows that each private Lab compares her new situation to the one in which no policy
is implemented at all, i.e. to the level π
¡
xd, y −mxd
¢
. This means that any lump-sum transfer
associated to the pigovian patents tax must leave at least π
¡
xd, y −mxd
¢
to each Lab. This
transfer F is therefore such that:
F = π
³
xd, y −mxd
´
− π (xc∗, y +∆∗ −mxc∗) + Ix>0txc∗
and the global maximal amount of money that can be extracted by the patents agency is given
by:
T = mπ (xc∗, y +∆∗ −mxc∗)| {z }
Πc(y+∆∗)
−mπ
³
xd, y −mxd
´
| {z }
Πd(y)
From that point of view, the optimal increase ∆∗ of the set of free Knowledge is implementable,
if the maximum amount of tax that can be collected covers the cost C(∆∗) of the research
contracts that must be signed with the University.
In order to check this last point, let us remember (see proposition 5) that the aggregate profit
level Πc(y) of the Private Labs at the centralized solution is strictly concave. By a standard
concavity argument, we can therefore say that:
Πc(y +∆∗)−Πc(y) > (Πc)0
¯¯
y+∆∗ ×∆∗
By the definition of an optimal allocation, we know that Πc(y) ≥ Πd(y), so that:
T = Πc(y +∆∗)−Πd(y) ≥ Πc(y +∆∗)−Πc(y)
Now let us remember that ∆∗ is obtained by (Πc)0
¯¯
y+∆∗ = C
0|∆∗ . By putting together the two
previous equations, we obtain that:
T > C 0
¯¯
∆∗ ×∆∗
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Finally, let us recall that the cost function C(∆) is convex and has the property that C(0) = 0.
By a standard convexity argument, we then know that the marginal cost is always greater then
the average cost. We can therefore conclude that:
T > C 0
¯¯
∆∗ ×∆∗ ≥ C(∆∗)
But the reader has surely observed that this last argument does not rely on symmetry. This
is why we can generalize to what is stated in proposition 6.
Proposition 6 Within our setting, a patents public agency has the ability, on the one hand,
to control by a suitable fiscal scheme the over-appropriation of the free and potentially useful
academic Knowledge in order to reduce the social appropriation costs and, on the other hand, to
finance, with these fees, some research projects in order to reach an optimal transfer of Knowledge
from the Universities to the Private Labs. In our specific model, a budget balanced fiscal scheme
associated to an optimal transfer of C(∆∗) to the University, which reaches the agreement of all
actors, is given by:
tj =
mX
k=1
k 6=j
∂Sπk (x
c∗
k , y +∆
∗ −Xc∗)
and Fj =
h
πj
³
xdj , y −Xd
´
− πj
¡
xc∗j , y +∆
∗ −Xc∗
¢i
+ Ixj>0tjx
c∗
j
6 Concluding remarks
This last proposition concludes our paper. It tells us that the patents agencies are not only
registration chambers which protect the innovators but are also a relevant instrument of an
innovation policy. We essentially looked at this question by considering the relation between
Science and Technology and more precisely the relation between public fundamental research
and Private heterogeneous R&D Labs. Following Dasgupta and David [9], we assumed that
these two institutions work with opposite institutional arrangements so that there is, on the
one hand, an over-appropriation of the free applicable results produced by the University while
there is, on the other hand, a relative scarcity of the amount of such applicable ideas since their
evaluation by academic standards are less eﬃcient. This over-appropriation issue was related
to the existence of accommodation costs: an idea issued from the academic sector must be
transformed in order to meet a social demand but all ideas do not have the same transformation
costs.
This brings us to the conclusion that a patents public agency can be a suitable instrument
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of this relation regulation. This agency has the ability to control the over-appropriation of this
Knowledge by setting suitable patents fees and therefore to contribute to the reduction of the
accommodation costs. But she can also contribute to an optimal provision of free useful ideas by
sponsoring, thanks to the returns of the patents fees, more or less targeted research programs, i.e.
research programs whose results solve more applied puzzles but nevertheless meet the academic
standards and which therefore increase the set of freely available ideas.
We must nevertheless concede that this paper can be too caricatural in several aspects. First
of all, we essentially concentrates on patents which are induced by free academic Knowledge,
as we said we only looked at upstream. We therefore neglected (i) the patents induced by
innovations generated by the applied Knowledge developed by the Private Labs or (ii) the
question of the renewal, breadth or length of a patent. The first point is linked to the sequential
aspect of the innovation process and the problem related to the anti-common tragedy introduces
by Heller and Eisenberg [14]. The second point refers to the kind of market protection from a
private and a social point of view. This point has induced a lot of works since Nordhaus’ [22]
seminal argument in favor of the finiteness of the patents length14. But many of these studies
often detect other sources of ineﬃciency that can, from our point of view, be corrected by an
appropriate patents fees policy.
Furthermore, the reader surely observed that our argument is worked out in a complete
information setting. From that point of view neither the University nor the Private Labs are
able to capture an information rent. In other words, the introduction of imperfect information
would lead to a second best solution since the patents agency has, on the one hand, to control
a Bayesian game between the Private Labs and, on the other hand, to manage a standard
Principal-Agent problem concerning her relation with the University.
Finally, we have also observed that the regulation introduced by the patents agency is glob-
ally improving. We can therefore, especially in the context of incomplete information, ask the
question of the existence of another institutional arrangement that also render the system more
eﬃcient. However and at least in the short term, we hope that we have convinced the reader
that we should see patents public oﬃces not as profit centers, but as agencies in charge of the
diﬀerent aspects of the innovation policy.
14 In order to reach such a conclusion, Nordhaus considered decreasing returns to scale concerning R&D activi-
ties. Moreover, by defining the breadth of a patent according to the monopoly power it gives to its owner, Gilbert
and Shapiro [12] concluded that a long and narrow patent is more likely to insure a given level of incentives. On
the contrary, Gallini [11] proposed to also measure a patent breadth with the R&D costs needed to imitate a
patented innovation outside the patent domain and proved that, within such a context, a short and large patent
is better.
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APPENDIX
A Proof of proposition 1
Step 1: (xdj )nj=1 is a NE if and only if ∀j = 1, . . . , n
∂xjπj
⎛
⎜⎝xdj , y − xdj −
mX
k=1
k 6=j
xdk
⎞
⎟⎠− ∂Sπj
⎛
⎜⎝xdj , y − xdj −
mX
k=1
k 6=j
xdk
⎞
⎟⎠ = 0
Since the profit functions πj(xj , S) are concave, standard concavity inequalities allow us to check that the
profit function of each player is concave with respect to her own strategic variable. It therefore remains to verify
that the constrains are not binding. If at equilibrium S = y − xdj −
Pm
k=1
k 6=j
xdk = 0, each player j has an incentive
to decrease xdj since we have assumed that lim
S→0
∂xjπj/∂Sπj < 1. Now let us assume that ∃j at equilibrium such
that xdj = 0. In this case this player has an incentive to increase x
d
j because one of our boundary conditions says
that ∀S > 0, lim
xj→0
∂xjπj/∂Sπj > 1.
Step 2: An application of the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT).
Let us define Hj(xj ,X, y) := ∂xjπj (xj , y −X)− ∂Sπj (xj , y −X) and let us look at Hj(xj , X, y) = 0 for any
fixed y (it will be omitted for the moment in order to spare notations). Since we have assumed that ∀S > 0,
lim
xj→0
∂xjπj/∂Sπj > 1 and ∀S > 0, limxj→+∞
∂xjπj/∂Sπj < 1, we respectively observe that ∀X < y, limxj→0
Hj(xj , X) >
0 and lim
xj→+∞
Hj(xj ,X) < 0. But we also know that ∂xjHj(xj , X) = ∂xj ,xjπj − ∂S,xjπj < 0. The IFT therefore
says that:
∃φj : ]0, y[→ R++ | Hj(φj(X),X) = 0
and that:
∂Xφj = −
∂XHj
∂xjHj
= −
−∂2xj ,Sπj + ∂
2
S,Sπj
+∂2xj ,xjπj − ∂2S,xjπj
< 0,
We can even go a step further and observe that:
∀X < y, φj(X) > 0 and limX→yφj(X) = 0
The last point is immediate. We have observed that ∀X < y, lim
xj→0
Hj(xj , X) > 0 and that ∂xjHj < 0 so that any
solution φj(X)must be strictly positive for X < y. Moreover, we have assumed that ∀xj > 0, limS→0∂xjπj/∂Sπj < 1,
so that ∀xj > 0, limX→yHj(xj ,X) < 0. If we have in mind that ∂xjHj(xj , X) < 0, the equation Hj(xj ,X) = 0
cannot admit a strictly positive solution as X goes to y. But we just check that xj = φj(X) > 0 for all X < y.
We can therefore conclude that lim
X→y
φj(X; y) = 0.
Step 3: The computation of an equilibrium.
Let us now construct Φ(X) :=
mP
j=1
φj(X) −X. By step 2, we know that limX→yφj(X) = 0, and that ∀X < y,
φj(X) > 0, we deduce respectively that limX→y
Φ(X) < 0 and that lim
X→0
Φ(X) > 0. By computation, we also
observe that ∂XΦ =
mP
j=1
∂Xφj − 1 < 0. We can therefore assert that ∃Xd ∈ ]0, y[ a unique scalar satisfying
Φ(Xd) = 0. So by moving back to step 2, we can say that there exists a unique vector
¡
xdj
¢m
j=1
=
¡
φj(X
d)
¢m
j=1
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which verifies the condition stated in equation (1). Moreover it is immediate, by construction, that xdj > 0 and
that
Pm
j=1 x
d
j = X
d < y for all y > 0.
B Proof of proposition 2
Let us now remark that the result of proposition 1 is true for each y and let us remember that the function φj
introduced in step 2 of the previous proof also takes y as an argument. By applying the IFT, we even observe
that ∂yφj(X, y) = −∂Xφj(X, y). So if we move to step 3 of the previous proof, we can, by using again the IFT,
observe that:
dXd
dy
= −
mP
j=1
∂yφj(X, y)Ã
mP
j=1
∂Xφj(X, y)
!
− 1
=
mP
j=1
∂Xφj(X, y)Ã
mP
j=1
∂Xφj(X, y)
!
− 1
> 0 since ∀j, ∂Xφj(X, y) < 0
Moreover,
dxdj
dy
= ∂Xφj(X
d(y), y)
dXd
dy
+ ∂yφj(X
d(y), y) = ∂Xφj(X
d(y), y)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
mP
j=1
∂Xφj(X
d(y), y)Ã
mP
j=1
∂Xφj(Xd(y), y)
!
− 1
− 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
∂Xφj(X
d(y), y)Ã
mP
j=1
∂Xφj(Xd(y), y)
!
− 1
> 0
It follows that:
dπdj
dy
= ∂xπj
dxdj
dy
+
µ
1− dX
d
dy
¶
∂Sπj = ∂xπj
dxdj
dy
+
∂Sπj
1−
Ã
mP
j=1
∂Xφj)
! > 0
which implies that:
dΠd
dy
=
mX
j=1
dπdj
dy
> 0
C Proof of proposition 3
This proof is going to be very closed to the one of proposition 1 and we will directly use some of its elements,
contained in steps 2 and 3.
Step 1: A preliminary observation.
Let us define, for a fixed y,Hdj (xj ,X, y) := ∂xjπj (xj , y −X)−∂Sπj (xj , y −X) andHcj (xj ,X, y) := ∂xjπj (xj , y −X)−
mP
k=1
∂Sπk (xk, y −X). We know from the proof of proposition 1 that ∃φdj (X, y) with the property thatHdj (φdj (X, y),X, y) =
0. Since we have assumed that ∀S > 0, lim
xj→0
∂xjπj/
mP
j=1
∂Sπj > 1 and lim
xj→+∞
∂xjπj/∂Sπj < 1, we can, by a similar
argument, also prove that ∃φcj(X, y) such that Hcj (φcj(X, y),X, y) = 0 and that ∂Xφcj(X, y) < 0. Now remember
that ∀j, ∂Sπj > 0. It follows that ∀(xj ,X, y), Hcj (xj , X; y) < Hdj (xj ,X; y). But we also know that ∂xjHdj < 0
and ∂xjH
c
j < 0. By combining these two observations, we obtain:
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∀j,∀ (X, y) , φcj(X, y) < φ
d
j (X, y)
Step 2: ∀y, Xc(y) < Xd(y)
Let us now construct Φc(X, y) :=
mP
j=1
φcj(X, y)−X and Φd(X, y) :=
mP
j=1
φdj (X, y)−X. The proof of proposition
1 tells us that ∃Xd(y) ∈ ]0, y[ verifying Φd(Xd, y) = 0. With a similar argument requiring the boundary condition
associated to the centralized problem, it is also easy to prove that ∃Xc(y) ∈ ]0, y[ , Φc(Xc, y) = 0. Now remember,
from step 1, that ∀ (X, y) , φcj(X, y) < φdj (X, y). It follows that ∀ (X, y) , Φc(X, y) < Φd(X, y). But we know that
∂XΦc < 0 and ∂XΦd < 0. We can therefore conclude that Xc(y) < Xd(y).
Step 3: ∀y, Πc(y) ≥ Πd(y)
This follows directly from the definition of a maximum.
D Proof of proposition 4
Let us first recall that a decentralized patent equilibrium associated to the fiscal scheme:
(tj , Fj)
m
j=1 =
⎛
⎜⎝
mX
k=1
k 6=j
∂Sπk (x
c
k, y −Xc) ,
h
πj
³
xdj , y −Xd
´
− πj
¡
xcj , y −Xc
¢i
+ Ixj>0tjx
c
j
⎞
⎟⎠
is a vector (x˜j)
m
j=1 of patents allocation with the property that:
∀j = 1, . . . ,m, x˜j ∈ argmax
xj∈Rm+
πj
⎛
⎜⎝xj , y − xj −
mX
k=1
k 6=j
x˜k
⎞
⎟⎠ − tjxj + Fj s.t. y − xj −
mX
k=1
k 6=j
x˜k ≥ 0 (5)
Step 1: Every equilibrium of the modified game is an interior one.
Let us first verify that ∀j, x˜j > 0. The definition of the fiscal scheme (tj , Fj) matters. In fact, we know that
tjxcj > 0 since (i) x
c
j > 0 i.e. eﬃcient allocations are interior solutions and (ii) ∀j, ∂Sπk (xk, S) > 0. So, if ∃j0,
x˜j0 = 0, this player obtains a strictly smaller transfer Fj than in a situation where she plays ε > 0. Because of
this jump and since πj0(xj0 , S) is continuous, we can choose an ε0 with the property that j0 is better oﬀ when
xj0 = ε0 is played.
Now assume that ∃j0, y− x˜j0 −
Pm
k=1
k 6=j
x˜k = 0. Since y > 0, we can choose j0 such that x˜j0 > 0. But we have
assumed that ∀xj > 0, lims→0 ∂xjπj/∂Sπj < 1 and we know that tj > 0. Player j0 has therefore an incentive to
decrease xdj because he increases her gross profit πj0(xj0 , S) and decreases the tax she pays.
Step 2: The modified game has at least an equilibrium.
By step 1, we knows that an equilibrium verifies:
∀j = 1, . . . ,m ∂xjπj
³
x˜j , y − X˜
´
− ∂Sπj
³
x˜j , y − X˜
´
−
mX
k=1
k 6=j
∂Sπk
³
x˜ck, y − X˜c
´
| {z }
:=Hj(x˜j ,X˜) with X˜:=
Pm
j=1 x˜j
= 0
and since πj (xj , S) is concave we can argue as in the proof of proposition 1 that these conditions are not only
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necessary but also suﬃcient. We can even observe that the centralized solution obtained in definition 2 solves
this system of equations. This modified game admits therefore at least one equilibrium given by
¡
x˜cj
¢m
j=1
.
Step 3: The modified game has a unique equilibrium.
Assume that ∃ (x˜j)mj=1 6=
¡
x˜cj
¢m
j=1
another equilibrium. First, let us assume that X˜ = X˜c, and let us choose
j0 such that x˜j0 6= x˜cj0 . Since ∂xHj0(xj0 , X˜) < 0 it is impossible that Hj(x˜j , X˜) = Hj(x˜cj , X˜) = 0. Now assume
that X˜ > X˜c, there exists therefore at least one j1,such that x˜j1 > x˜
c
j1 . Since ∂XHj0(xj0 ,X) > 0, we have
Hj0(x˜j0 , X˜) > Hj0(x˜j0 , X˜
c) and since ∂xHj0(xj0 , X˜
c) < 0 we observe that Hj0(x˜j0 , X˜) > Hj0(x˜j0 , X˜) = 0, a
contradiction. Finally, observe that symmetric argument works when X˜ < X˜c.
E Proof of proposition 5
(i) This point is obvious.
(ii) By the envelop theorem, we immediately obtain that Πc(y) is increasing since:
dΠc(y)
dy
=
mX
j=1
∂Sπj
¡
xcj(y), y −Xc(y)
¢
> 0
It remains to check that Πc(y) is concave. So let us choose y1, y2 ∈ R and λ ∈ ]0, 1[. Moreover let us denote by
(x1j)
m
j=1 and (x
2
j)
m
j=1 the optimal patents allocation under respectively y
1 and y2. It is a matter of fact to observe
that λx1j + (1− λ)x2j is a feasible allocation when the stock is λy1 + (1− λ)y2:
mX
j=1
¡
λx1j + (1− λ)x2j
¢
≤ λy1 + (1− λ)y2
By definition of a maximum which is unique in our case, we have:
Πc
¡
λy1 + (1− λ)y2
¢
=
mX
j=1
πj
Ã
λx1j + (1− λ)x2j , λy1 + (1− λ)y2 −
mX
j=1
¡
λx1j + (1− λ)x2j
¢!
=
mX
j=1
πj
Ã
λx1j + (1− λ)x2j , λ
Ã
y1 −
mX
j=1
x1j
!
+ (1− λ)
Ã
y2 −
mX
j=1
x2j
!!
> λ
mX
j=1
πj
Ã
x1j , y
1 −
mX
j=1
x1j
!
+ (1− λ)
mX
j=1
πj
Ã
x2j , y
2 −
mX
j=1
x2j
!
since for j = 1, . . . ,m, πj(x, S) is concave in S. Thus, we can conclude that:
Πc
¡
λy1 + (1− λ)y2
¢
> λΠc(y1) + (1− λ)Πc(y2)
(iii) Let us come back to the proof of proposition 3. We have observed that Φc(X, y) :=
mP
j=1
φcj(X, y) − X = 0
where Hcj (φ
c
j(X, y),X, y) = 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,m and H
c
j (xj ,X, y) := ∂xjπj (xj , y −X)−
mP
k=1
∂Sπk (xk, y −X). If
follows by the IFT that:
dXc
dy
= −
mP
j=1
∂yφcj
mP
j=1
∂Xφcj − 1
, ∂Xφ
c
j(X, y) = −
−∂2xj ,Sπj +
mP
k=1
∂2S,Sπk
∂2xj ,xjπj − ∂2S;xjπj
and ∂yφ
c
j(X, y) = −∂Xφ
c
j(X, y)
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But we have assumed that for all j = 1, . . . ,m, ∂2xj ,Sπj > 0, ∂
2
xj ,xjπj < 0 and ∂
2
S,Sπj < 0. We deduce that
∂Xφcj(X, y) < 0, ∂yφ
c
j(X, y) > 0 and that
dXc
dy
> 0. It remains to check that Sc(y) = y − Xc(y) is increasing.
This is immediate by computation since:
dSc
dy
= 1− dX
c
dy
= 1−
mP
j=1
∂Xφcj
mP
j=1
∂Xφcj − 1
=
−1
mP
j=1
∂Xφcj − 1
> 0
F Proof of proposition 6
This proof is obvious.
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